

During 1946–47, Stalin made sure that Communist governments came to power in all the countries of eastern Europe (the countries which Russia had conquered in 1945). Churchill was worried about Soviet influence in eastern Europe even *during* the war, and clashed with Stalin over it at the Tehran Conference of 1943.

In October 1944, Churchill went to Moscow to meet Stalin face-to-face and made the so-called 'percentages agreement', where Churchill suggested that Russia and Britain agree 'spheres of influence' in the different countries of eastern Europe (Romania 90-10, Greece 10-90, Yugoslavia and Hungary 50-50 etc.). Stalin agreed.

Although the Soviet Union took complete 100% control of the Iron Curtain countries after the war, Stalin did keep his promise to stay out of Greece.

The Hungarian Communist Rakosi described this process as 'slicing salami' – gradually getting rid of all opposition, bit-by-bit. In this way, Russia gained control of:

One of the major objectives of the Potsdam conference, as stated by Secretary of State Byrnes, was to reach agreement on "plans for carrying out the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, with the hope of ending the constant friction which had prevailed over Russian policy in Eastern Europe since the Yalta Conference." The American delegation (and for that matter the British delegation headed by Attlee) contemplated no "showdown" with Russia such as Churchill had planned. On the contrary, as Byrnes put it, in words true for Britain and Western public opinion at large as well as for America: "The Soviet Union then had in the United States a deposit of good will as great, if not greater, than that of any other country." Western complaints against Russian policy in the liberated countries were indignantly rejected by Stalin. He was "against sovietization of any of those countries," Stalin assured Churchill.

Secretary of State Byrnes suspected that East- West "friendship" would require the West to let the Soviet Union establish "complete suzerainty" over the Eastern European states.

It can only be surmised that Western firmness could have stopped Soviet aggressiveness. It is certain, however, that Western softness ruined whatever chances existed for saving Eastern Europe from complete Soviet domination. The West's appeasement policy toward Russia was led by the United States. Critics of the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, have often pointed out his inexperience in foreign affairs. Sumner Welles, for instance, spoke of Byrnes's profound ignorance of even the rudimentary facts of international life. Whatever his shortcomings, however, it seems that Byrnes's conduct of American foreign policy was in harmony with the public opinion then prevailing in the West, and even in accordance with the fundamental meaning of the Yalta agreements, namely, that friendship between Russia and her western neighbors should be the cornerstone of peace in Europe.

With American demobilization the West's military strength, which was the asset Russia admired above all, melted away from Europe as Churchill had feared, while the West now focused its policy on the drafting of the first five peace treaties with former enemy states, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Finland. The irony of this period of peacemaking

was that while the Western Powers were anxious to speed up work on the peace treaties in the hope that termination of the state of war and withdrawal of occupation forces would reduce Russian influence, the Russians were rapidly extending their grip over the whole of Eastern Europe, including former allied as well as former enemy countries. In two of the former enemy states, Bulgaria and Romania, sovietization made great headway behind the facade of the "National Front" coalition governments. In Hungary where alone of the Soviet-occupied countries a promising start had been made toward democracy, with the free elections of 1945, the chief aim of Soviet tactics was to destroy the Smallholders' party which represented the majority of the electorate (57 percent) in the coalition government.

Communist strategy to seize power by infiltration, terror and the splitting up of anti-Communist forces ("polarization" of the enemy, as Communist jargon called it) was not confined to the former enemy states. The pattern was basically the same everywhere: the Communists seized control of the "levers of power," in particular the security police, the army general staff and the publicity machine.⁶ They wiped out the independent Socialist workers' organizations by "uniting" them with the Communist parties. They crushed peasant resistance to communism by destroying the independent agrarian parties.

In **Poland** the target of Soviet attacks was Mikolajczyk's agrarian Polish People's party, a suppressed minority in the coalition government, but representative of the majority of the Polish people.

Meanwhile, in **Yugoslavia** no Soviet interference was needed to promote communism: Tito was both determined and sufficiently strong to extirpate the opponents of his Communist dictatorship. The dramatic climax of Tito's unscrupulous drive against his enemies was the execution of Draza Mihailovic, his rival in the partisans' war against Germany.

While the Communists were leading the campaign of retribution for crimes committed during the Hitler era, they were themselves perpetrating criminal acts. In spite of official tact toward Soviet Russia, the Western governments could not help but notice violations of the Yalta agreements in the Soviet sphere of influence. Western protests against rigged elections, arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, coercion, intimidation, violence and disregard of international obligations in the Soviet satellites soon became a matter of Western diplomatic routine. The battle of diplomatic notes was on, while the Big Four Foreign Ministers worked on the first five peace treaties.

Why did Stalin fail to get control of Yugoslavia?

Yugoslavia was the only eastern European country which did not fall under Soviet control.

There were a number of reasons for this:

1. Yugoslavia was not liberated by the Red Army. Instead, Yugoslavia was liberated by an army of Yugoslav partisans. This army was 300,000 strong, but it was led by the Communists.

2. The Yugoslav Communist leader Tito was not a Soviet-trained Stalinist – he was an independent, greatly-respected national leader, and he refused to do as Moscow ordered.
3. Yugoslav communism was as nationalist as it was communist.

Why did relations between Yugoslavia and Stalin break down?

At first, relations between Belgrade and Moscow seemed good – in fact, Yugoslavia joined the first Cominform in 1947, which was held in Belgrade.

However, gradually after 1945, relations between Yugoslavia and Moscow were growing increasingly strained:

1. Even during the war, in 1943, the 'Committee of Liberation' proclaimed the overthrow of the Yugoslav government in exile, banned the return of king Peter Yugoslavia, and declared Yugoslavia to be a Communist state ruled by Tito; this was in defiance of Stalin's agreement with the allies to support King Peter.
2. After the war, Tito tried to capture Trieste from Italy, which brought him into open fighting with the Americans (during the conflict, the Yugoslavs shot down four US planes). Stalin tried to stop Tito, because he did not want to fall out with Britain and America, but Tito ignored him.
3. In 1946, Tito supported the Greek communists against the British in Greece – again against the wishes of Stalin, who had promised Churchill that he would stay out of Greece.
4. In 1947 Tito, again without consulting Stalin, tried to organize a federation Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania into a 'Land of the South Slavs'.
5. Tito wanted to apply for Marshall Aid, something else which Stalin did not want; in fact, after Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform, Tito asked the United States for Marshall Aid and received more than \$150 million.
6. In 1948 Tito arrested a number of Soviet spies and Stalinists who were trying to get him replaced. The most prominent, Andrija Hebrang (Stalin's candidate to replace Tito) was killed in prison in 1949.

1948: the break with Stalin

In 1948 Moscow sent a number of letters of complaint against the Yugoslavian Communist Party. When one of these accused the Yugoslavians of being ungrateful to the Red Army, the YCP pointed out strongly that they had not been liberated by the Soviet Union! This kind of resistance was unheard of.

Therefore, Tito did not attend the second meeting of Cominform, which **expelled Yugoslavia in June 1948**.

Shortly afterwards, the Soviet Union, followed by the other Iron Curtain countries, broke off diplomatic relations with Tito. After 1948, 'Tito-ists' (communists who believed that national communist parties should be independent of the Soviet Union) were expelled from communist parties in the other Iron Curtain countries.

The peace treaties were signed in Paris on February 10, 1947, but the expectation that they would be instrumental in reducing Soviet influence in Central Europe proved entirely unrealistic. In Hungary and Romania, even the peace treaties entitled the Russians to keep military units to maintain "lines of communication" to their zone of occupation in Austria. But no treaties, however perfect, could have forced the Russians out of the Danube Valley anyway. The Communists, far from withdrawing, were stepping up their offensive throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

In **Hungary** the decisive moment, portending the end of the democratic prelude to Communist dictatorship, came in February 1947, when Béla Kovács general secretary of the Smallholders' party, was arrested by the Soviet authorities on charges of reactionary conspiracy. Toward the end of May a Communist coup overthrew the government of the Smallholders, premier, Ferenc Nagy, who was also accused by the Communists of being involved in this alleged conspiracy. But in fact, the Smallholders' party was not involved in any conspiracy, and the accusation against it by the Communists was a blow against democratic elements. For though the party was not altogether immune to reactionary influences, its bulk was made up of peasants who were stalwart supporters of agrarian reform, the backbone of Hungarian democracy in the making. Premier Nagy was vacationing in Switzerland at the time of the coup and he was called to return in order to clear himself of the Communist charges. With the choice of becoming a martyr or an exile, he chose the latter. His successor was an obscure figure of his own party. But the country's real boss was now Mátyás Rákosi, one of the outstanding figures of international communism and a self- confessed practitioner of so- called "salami tactics," which consisted of slicing up the Opposition piece by piece until all opposition was destroyed.

Following the Communist coup in Hungary new elections were held in the summer of 1947. In spite of intimidation and fraud, the Communist party gained only 22 percent of the votes (as against 17 percent in 1945), while the ad hoc organized opposition, lucky to have survived the pre- election terror, the Independence party and the Catholic Democratic People's party, received 30 percent. The remaining votes went to the Smallholders and the National Peasants, who, purged of their democratic leaders, became mere tools of the Communists in the "coalition." Soon all the opposition parties, harassed by the Communists, were disbanded, and their leaders fled to the West.

In August- September 1947, the spotlight was turned on the rule of The New Central Europe.

Terror in **Bulgaria**, when the peasant leader, Nikola Petkov, was tried and executed. Dimitrov, the country's Communist dictator, later declared he could not pardon Petkov because the Western Powers had intervened on his behalf, and this constituted interference with Bulgaria's sovereignty. Implied in Dimitrov's statement was the warning that Western protests would not deter the Communists from their chosen path, quite the contrary.

In **Romania**, in October, the aged leader of the Romanian Peasant party, Iuliu Maniu, was put on trial, to be sentenced to life imprisonment. In the same month Mikolajczyk was accused by the Communists of being an "agent of Western imperialists" and he fled from Poland. In December, Michael King of Romania, then a figurehead only, abdicated and left the country. Thus the last of the kingdoms in the Soviet orbit fell. (The British saved, in Greece, one of the five pre-war Balkan kingdoms.) Romania, proclaimed a republic, followed the example of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Hungary which had been a kingdom without a king ever since 1919. But republicanism, the cherished ideal of so many democrats in these former monarchies, did not expand the rule of democracy. Communist control over the satellites of the Soviet sphere of influence was being drawn tighter and tighter. Only one country, Czechoslovakia, seemed to be able to get along with Russia without succumbing to Soviet domination, as had once been hoped for all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The [military occupation](#) of [Czechoslovakia](#) by [Nazi Germany](#) began with the German [annexation](#) of the [Sudetenland](#) in 1938, continued with the creation of the [Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia](#), and by the end of 1944 extended to all parts of Czechoslovakia.

Following the [Anschluss](#) of [Austria](#) to [Nazi Germany](#) in March 1938 and after he had obtained the [Munich Agreement](#) in September 1938, [Adolf Hitler](#) annexed the [ethnic Germans](#) living in Czech regions. The loss of Sudetenland was detrimental to the defense of Czechoslovakia as the extensive [Czechoslovak border fortifications](#) were also located in the same area. As a consequence, the incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany that began on 1 October 1938 left the rest of Czechoslovakia weak. Moreover, a small northeastern part of the borderland region known as [Zaolzie](#) was occupied and annexed to [Poland](#) ostensibly to "protect" the local [ethnic Polish](#) community and as a result of previous territorial claims ([Czech-Polish disputes](#) in the years of 1918–20). Furthermore, by the [First Vienna Award](#), [Hungary](#) received the southern territories of Slovakia and [Carpathian Ruthenia](#), which were largely inhabited by Hungarians.

The Munich Agreement was supposed to end Hitler's territorial ambitions in Europe and ensure that peace would prevail. However, in March 1939, Hitler's forces invaded Czechoslovakia. They took all the territory with ease.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis happened with very little resistance to the German army. The invasion of Czechoslovakia made it clear that Hitler could not be trusted to keep his promises and agreements. Therefore the world started to prepare for war. Britain and France declared that if Hitler set his sights on Poland that they would have to declare war on Germany. Appeasement was over, but that fact had continued for so long and Hitler had got his way and made sure that Hitler was confident that nothing would stop him in his conquest of Europe.

Organisations

Instead, in **October 1947**, he set up Cominform. Every Communist party in Europe joined. This allowed Stalin control of the Communists in Europe.

Then, in **January 1949**, Stalin created [Comecon](#) - an economic union of the Communist countries in eastern Europe. This allowed Stalin to control the Iron Curtain economies for the benefit of Russia - for instance, one of its rules was that all inventions had to be shared.

Truman noted that [Turkey](#) too was in danger from Soviet aggression, so Congress voted to give aid to Turkey as well.

Part of the money was given in economic and humanitarian aid, but most was spent on military supplies and weapons.

CONTAINMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION

The Moscow Conference [March 1947] marked the final U.S. effort to cooperate with the Soviet Union. American leaders were convinced at last that Russia was incorrigible. From this point on, they saw the dispute with Communism as a sort of Manichaean contest between the forces of light and the diabolical powers of darkness.

The policy adopted to deal with this new world formed around the "long telegram" written on February 22, 1946, by George F. Kennan, chargé at the Moscow embassy. Kennan held that the Soviet Union and its satellites could be "contained" within their present boundaries and that, over time, internal and external stress would sap Russia's strength and end Russia's aggressive ambitions.

Kennan believed that the Soviet leaders were obligated to depict the United States as menacing in order to give them an excuse to rule their people by repression, the only method they understood. This inherent conflict between Moscow and the West meant that the two sides could never permanently resolve their differences. That is why the West could only contain Soviet expansionist efforts....

In the new orthodoxy of containment, the United States would resist all future Soviet expansion but not liberate areas already under Kremlin control. Kennan recommended applying counter force to the Russians at every point. For example, the United States should set up bases at strategic points around the peripheries of the Soviet empire. These would protect sea lanes and provide stations for long-range bombers. Surrounding the Soviet Union, Kennan wrote, would incite "the traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity," the root of the "Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs." This paranoia would induce the leaders to concentrate more and more resources on nonproductive military forces and less on better living standards for the people.

The 'Cold War Was a mixture of religious crusade in favour of one ideology or the other, and of the most ruthless power politics, striking out for advantage or expansion not only in Europe but all over the world.

PJ Larkin, *European History for Certificate Classes (1965)*
A student examination revision book.

The common concerns that had united the former allies (namely the fight against fascism and Nazi Germany) disappeared leaving only two radically different political, social, economic and ideological systems.

Donette Murray, *To What Extent was the Cold War a Struggle between Irreconcilable Ideologies?* (1999)

Donette Murray was a lecturer at the University of Ulster.

CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR

In many ways, Britain and America were natural enemies of the Soviet Union. So it is in fact easy to answer: 'Why did the USA-USSR alliance begin to break down in 1945?' As soon as the common threats of Hitler and Japan were removed, it was inevitable that the allies would fall out.

During the war, there had been growing tensions:

- For a long time, Stalin refused to join the United Nations;
- Stalin was angry that Britain and America kept delaying D-Day, believing it was a plot to allow Germany to weaken the Soviet Union;
- At the Tehran Conference (1943) Stalin and Churchill clashed over how much control Stalin would have over the countries of eastern Europe.

However, the 'Big Three' - especially President Roosevelt - knew that they had to stay allied until the end of the war, so they managed to patch up these differences. As soon as it was clear that the war was coming to an end, however, more and more cracks appeared in the alliance until it finally split apart altogether and the allies of the war became enemies.

This webpage concentrates on the UNDERLYING DIFFERENCES which made the Cold War inevitable. The following webpages look at the events which first strained and then destroyed the understanding between the powers.

2. Aims

- Stalin wanted huge reparations from Germany, and a 'buffer' of friendly states to protect the USSR from being invaded again.
- Britain and the USA wanted to protect democracy, and help Germany to recover. They were worried that large areas of eastern Europe were falling under Soviet control.

This meant that the 'Big Three' found it difficult to get agreement at the Conferences (Tehran, [Yalta](#), [Potsdam](#)) which outlined the principles of the post-war peace.

And it proved impossible to get agreement on the details at the Conference of Ministers - set up after the war to agree the post-war settlement - and the Conference eventually broke down altogether:

3. Resentment about History

- The Soviet Union could not forget that in 1918 Britain and the USA had tried to destroy the Russian Revolution.
- Britain and the USA could not forget that Stalin had signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact with Germany in 1939.

These resentments were part of the underlying ideological gulf between the two sides, but they also provided weapons in the propaganda war which both sides waged against each other.

4. Events

Against this background of underlying differences in ideologies, aims, and historical resentments, there were a series of events which bit-by-bit broke down the alliance and turned the allies of the war into enemies.

Neither side trusted the other. Because they were so different, each side saw each event differently, and believed they were in the right ... and that the other side was in the wrong. So every action they took made them hate each other more:

WHAT CAUSED THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

1. **Cold War**
was just getting started (e.g. [Czechoslovakia](#), March 1948)
2. **Aims**
Stalin wanted to destroy Germany – Britain and the USA wanted to rebuild Germany.
3. **Bizonia**
The Russians were taking German machinery back to the USSR. In January 1947, Britain and the USA joined their two zones together to try to get German industry going. They called the new zone Bi-zonia ('two zones').
4. **American Aid**
Congress voted for [Marshall Aid](#) on 31 March 1948.

Immediately, the Russians started searching all road and rail traffic into Berlin.

5. **New Currency**

On 1 June, America and France announced that they wanted to create the new country of West Germany; and on 23 June they introduced a new currency into 'Bizonia' DEUTSCHEMARK and western Berlin. The next day the Russians stopped all road and rail traffic into Berlin.

The Soviet Union saw the 1948 Berlin crisis as an attempt to undermine Soviet influence in eastern Germany; Stalin said he was defending the east German economy against the new currency, which was ruining it.

The western powers said Stalin was trying to force them out of Berlin.

Airlift Facts

- The blockade lasted 318 days (11 months).
- In the winter of 1948–49 Berliners lived on dried potatoes, powdered eggs and cans of meat. They had four hours of electricity a day.
- The airlift was codenamed 'operation Vittles'; the first flight was on 26 June 1948.
- The Soviet authorities offered to provide West Berlin with essential supplies - this offer was rejected.
- [275,000 flights](#) carried in 1½ million tons of supplies. A plane landed every 3 mins.
- On 16 April 1949, 1400 flights brought in 13,000 tons of supplies in one day – Berlin only needed 6,000 tons a day to survive.
- Some pilots dropped [chocolate](#) and sweets.
- The airlift continued until 30 September 1949, in order to build up a reserve of supplies.
- The USA stationed B-29 bombers (which could carry an atomic bomb) in Britain.
- The American airmen were regarded as [heroes](#)

What were the Results? [CENA]

1. **Cold War got worse**

It almost started an all-out war.

2. **East and West Germany**

Germany split up. In May 1949, America, Britain and France united their zones into the Federal Republic of

Germany (West Germany). In October 1949, Stalin set up the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) .

3. **NATO and the Warsaw Pact**

In 1949, the western Allies set up [NATO](#) more (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) as a defensive alliance against Russia. NATO countries surrounded Russia; in 1955, the Soviet Union set up the [Warsaw Pact](#) – an alliance of Communist states.

4. **Arms Race**

After Berlin, the USA and the USSR realized that they were in a **competition for world domination**. They began to build up their armies and weapons.

Two years after the Second World War, on 4 March 1947, France and Britain signed the *Treaty of Dunkirk*, to support each other if either of them should 'become again involved in hostilities with Germany'.

A year later, on 17 March 1948, France and Britain joined with Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to sign the *Treaty of Brussels*. In many ways, this looked like an expansion of the *Treaty of Dunkirk*. However, there were key differences, inasmuch as the *Treaty of Brussels*:

1. pledged to 'fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty'.
2. changed 'involved in hostilities with Germany' to 'an armed attack in Europe'.

So it was clear that, in the *Treaty of Brussels*, attention had shifted from the danger of Germany to the danger from the Soviet Union. Next month, in April 1948, the Brussels Pact agreed to set up a 'Western Union Defense Organization' (WUDO). WUDO was formed in September 1948 (during the Berlin crisis), and in 1949 it held a naval training exercise in the Bay of Biscay involving 60 British, French, and Dutch warships.

The Formation of NATO

It was becoming increasingly clear that no European force would be strong enough to stop the Red Army if Stalin attacked, so in March 1949 the Brussels Pact opened secret negotiations with the Americans, and in April 1949 the *North Atlantic Treaty* was signed, which set up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Principles

The *North Atlantic Treaty* promised:

- To safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty.

- Continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

However, Article 4 stated:

- If an armed attack occurs, each of them [will help with] such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force. (i.e. they promised to help, but not necessarily to send military aid).
- And Article 5 limited the alliance's operations to the 'area north of the Tropic of Cancer' (i.e. the North Atlantic).

The Treaty also set up a Council which would meet regularly as necessary. It should be clear from this that the chief aim of NATO was to resist the threat of the Soviet Union, and that - as the words 'continuous and effective' indicated - that this would be a very active, armed resistance.

Achievements

Key achievements have been:

1. 1300 **STANAGs** (Standardization Agreements), including standardized bullets (so all NATO soldiers can fire the same bullets), aircraft marshaling signals (so any NATO aircraft could land at any NATO base) and the [NATO phonetic alphabet](#)).
2. NATO countries participated in the **Korean War** in 1950-3.
3. The 1952 **Lisbon Conference** expanded NATO:



it planned the Long-Term Defence Plan.



It set up a permanent force of 35 divisions supported by nuclear weapons.



It set up the post of Secretary General (Baron Hastings Ismay was the first) with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) situated in Paris.

4. **Military Exercises**. In September 1952, Operation Mainbrace was the first major NATO naval exercise (200 ships practiced defending Denmark and Norway). NATO also held regular army exercises (including practising retreating in good order before overwhelming Soviet forces).
5. The **Clandestine Planning Committee** (CPC) planned guerrilla resistance in any country which might be conquered by the Soviets ('Operation Gladio').
6. In 1962, NATO countries were on standby during the **Cuban Missiles crisis**.

WHAT WAS THE WARSAW PACT

The Warsaw Pact was a collective defense treaty established by the Soviet Union and seven other Soviet satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania (Albania withdrew in 1968). Formally known as the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, the Warsaw Pact was created on 14 May 1955, immediately after the accession of West Germany to the Alliance. It complemented the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which was the regional economic organization set up by the Soviet Union in January 1949 for the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact embodied what was referred to as the Eastern bloc, while NATO and its member countries represented the Western bloc. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were ideologically opposed and, over time, built up their own defenses starting an arms race that lasted throughout the Cold War.

The Warsaw Pact was the first step in a more systematic plan to strengthen the Soviet hold over its satellites, a program undertaken by the Soviet leaders [Nikita Khrushchev](#) and [Nikolay Bulganin](#) after their assumption of power early in 1955. The treaty also served as a lever to [enhance](#) the bargaining position of the Soviet Union in [international diplomacy](#), an [inference](#) that may be drawn by the concluding article of the treaty, which [stipulated](#) that the Warsaw agreement would lapse when a general East-West collective-security pact should come into force.

The Kennan Long telegram and the Novikov telegram: these two reports from the ambassadors in the Soviet and American embassies show the attitudes towards each other's countries.

George Kennan's Long Telegram to Nikolai Novikov's telegram to Moscow Washington

Reported that attitudes in Moscow were hostile towards the USA.

Stalin held a firm belief in the destruction of capitalism.

Kennan believed that the Soviets would

back down if faced with tough resistance from the West. This played a key role in American foreign policy in the following years.

Believed the the US wanted to use their strong military to dominate the world.

Told Moscow that the Americans no longer wanted to cooperate with the Soviets.

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